Grand Valley State University

ScholarWorks@GVSU
Features

Hauenstein Center for Presidential Studies

10-18-2007

Abraham Lincoln, Praetor Maximus
Brian Flanagan
Grand Valley State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/features
Recommended Citation
Flanagan, Brian, "Abraham Lincoln, Praetor Maximus" (2007). Features. Paper 25.
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/features/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Hauenstein Center for Presidential Studies at ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Features by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu.

H-Net Reviews

Page 1 of 4

Daniel Farber. Lincoln's Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003. ix + 240 pp. $27.50 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-226-23793-0;
$14.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-226-23796-1.
Reviewed by Brian Flanagan (Hauenstein Center for Presidential Studies,
Grand Valley State University)
Published on H-CivWar (August, 2007)
Abraham Lincoln, Praetor Maximus
Examples abound in history, of leaders who have taken on dictatorial
powers at the expense of constitutional order--Lucius Cornelius Sulla and
Julius Caesar in classical Rome; Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, Hideki Tojo,
Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini in modern Europe and Asia. It would
come as a shock to the sensibilities of most Americans who revere their
sixteenth president that Abraham Lincoln is often placed in the company
of such leaders. As we approach the bicentennial of Lincoln's birth, it is
important to remember that throughout the Civil War he took actions that
were viewed by many of his contemporaries--and are still viewed by
many scholars--as beyond the limits of ordinary presidential authority, as
perhaps dictatorial.
In 1861, after the South's attack on Fort Sumter, newly inaugurated
President Lincoln opted for several counter-offensives that fell squarely
within Article I of the United States Constitution, describing the national
legislature's authority--not the president's. He blockaded Southern ports
(effectively declaring a state of war); suspended habeas corpus between
Washington D.C. and Philadelphia, and eventually across the North;
expanded the regular army and navy; and ordered the U.S. Treasury to
advance two million dollars to a private firm in New York for
discretionary use on war supplies. Later he instituted military trials across
North and South to dispense justice and ignored a Supreme Court
directive challenging his authority to suspend the writ. Even the
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln himself admitted, would have been
beyond his authority in peacetime.
But 1861-65 was a time of rebellion--of Civil War--in the United States.
How does this extraordinary circumstance change the legal implications
of Lincoln's actions?
Enter Daniel Farber.
Farber's book, Lincoln's Constitution, could justifiably be re-titled
"Lincoln's Constitutionality"(at the expense of the author's double
entendre): it is more correctly characterized as an assessment of the
legality of Lincoln's presidency than as an analysis of his interpretation
(or reinterpretation) of the U.S. Constitution. In fact, this is one notable
limit to Farber's legal history of the executive administration of the Civil
War. He does not consider, as Garry Wills has, the significance of the
Gettysburg Address in changing the Constitution by cleansing it of "that
legal compromise" over the issue of slavery and by appealing instead to
its "spirit," its moral root in the Declaration of Independence.[1] Except in
passing, he does not consider, as David Herbert Donald has, Lincoln's
Whig understanding of the Constitution that actually weakened the
executive branch in relation to Congress and the cabinet, even if in war
decisions it tended toward John Quincy Adams's expansive view that, "by
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the laws of war an invaded country has all its laws and municipal
institutions swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them....
Whether the war be civil, servile, or foreign ... the military authority takes
for the time the place of all municipal institutions, slavery among the
rest."[2]
Farber's analysis of Lincoln's abidance by constitutional law,
congressional statute, presidential precedent, and Supreme Court ruling is
exhaustive. With the possible exception of J. G. Randall, no scholar to
date has made as thorough a study of Lincoln's war measures in light of
American law. More limited analyses have stopped at the (accurate)
assertion that Lincoln himself never claimed his sweeping use of power
was ordinarily legal. In essence, he went stovepipe hat in hand to a special
session of Congress to ask ratification of his otherwise extralegal
usurpation of congressional authority:
"These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon, under
what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting,
then as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of
Congress."[3]
More limited analyses have pointed to Congress's August 1861
ratification of Lincoln's actions, the Supreme Court's March 1863 Prize
Cases decision upholding the legality of his early war measures, and
Congress's 1863 Habeas Corpus Indemnity Act, which retroactively
authorized all arrests and seizures made under authority of the president.
More limited analyses have gone back further to emphasize the 1787
Constitutional Convention's decision to replace Congress's authority to
"make" war with its authority to "declare" war, leaving it to the president
to repel sudden attacks. Much more limited analyses have claimed broad,
inherent, executive war powers--out of reach of the legislative and
judicial branches--and other exclusively presidential prerogatives deduced
from Article II clauses of the United States Constitution. These analyses
have used the uncharacteristic claim of a preeminent constructionist,
Thomas Jefferson, that jeopardizing the nation's "very high interests ... by
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself ...
thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means."[4] Or they have used
Lincoln's refrain defending suspension of the writ, "are all the laws, but
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?"[5] Together, these arguments can be used to make a
strong case for the constitutionality of Lincoln's war measures, and all are
assessed by Farber--most of them in one chapter.
But it is important--especially as debates persist today over the balance
between national security and individual rights, presidential and
congressional authority, national and state sovereignty--to remember that
Lincoln's presidency was extraordinary in our history. It is important, as
we read presidential historian Michael Beschloss trumpeting the supreme
value of presidential courage, to look closer at Lincoln's actions and
understand where at crucial moments he probably overstepped his
authority--even if he has been vindicated by history.[6] It is important, as
Lincoln scholar Vernon Orville Burton pins the roots of an "imperial
presidency" in the sixteenth president's "cavalier" approach to civil
liberties, to recognize where the president was squarely within his legal
bounds and where he showed great restraint.[7]
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For this, we can return to Daniel Farber's legal history of Lincoln's war
decisions. Farber, the Sho Sato Professor of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, and McKnight Presidential Professor of Law at the
University of Minnesota, has given us a disciplined and fair look at the
sixteenth president's most controversial decisions. Farber considers a wide
range of arguments both defending and condemning Lincoln: from his pre
-presidential conclusion that secession was indeed illegal--that the federal
government had authority to coerce state governments into recognizing
the supreme law of the land--to his exercise of powers ordinarily reserved
by Congress, to his administration's infringements on individual liberties
in North and South. The author is decisive where possible but allows
uncertainty to remain where it must--particularly on constitutional
questions of "original intent" that the framers themselves debated until
their deaths.
Farber's conclusions, overall, are favorable to Lincoln's legacy. With the
exception of some prominent freedom of speech infringements and cases
of unjustified abridgement of individual rights in the North, most of what
Lincoln did was strictly constitutional, falling within explicit presidential
or congressional authority. It is a vital distinction, of course, that Lincoln's
use of congressional powers--though probably necessary and in line with
the "classic liberal view of emergency power"--were "approved and in all
respects legalized and made valid" by Congress (p. 194). "Nowhere was
there any thought," writes Farber, "that necessity alone gave the president
an exemption from the legal consequences of violating statutory or
constitutional requirements. Lincoln does not seem to have claimed such
legal authority" (p. 195). Instead, Lincoln was retroactively granted
executive and legislative prerogative to deal with the consequences of
rebellion in the South.
Such being the case, Abraham Lincoln's accusers turn out to be right. In
the classical Roman sense, he may accurately be called a dictator--a
praetor maximus--vested temporarily with extraordinary power to deal
with crisis. It is lucky, Farber reminds us, that at the crucial moment a
man of "unshakable determination, combined with a shrewd sense of
reality" was available to lead (p. 199).
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